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ABSTRACT
In recent years, developers have used the proliferation of biomet-
ric sensors in smart devices, along with recent advances in deep
learning, to implement an array of biometrics-based authentica-
tion systems. Though these systems demonstrate remarkable per-
formance and have seen wide acceptance, they present unique
and pressing security and privacy concerns. One proposed method
which addresses these concerns is the elegant, fusion-based BioCap-
sule method. The BioCapsule method is provably secure, privacy-
preserving, cancellable and flexible in its secure feature fusion de-
sign. In this work, we extend BioCapsule to face-based recognition.
Moreover, we incorporate state-of-art deep learning techniques into
a BioCapsule-based facial authentication system to further enhance
secure recognition accuracy. We compare the performance of an un-
derlying recognition system to the performance of the BioCapsule-
embedded system in order to demonstrate the minimal effects of
the BioCapsule scheme on underlying system performance. We also
demonstrate that the BioCapsule scheme outperforms or performs
as well as many other proposed secure biometric techniques.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Biometrics;Privacy-preserving pro-
tocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Within biometric recognition systems, users utilize their physio-
logical and behavioral biometric traits in order to be recognized.
This grants the user the convenience of not needing to carry with
them a traditional means of authentication. Though biometrics offer
this convenience, they also present unique, pressing security and
privacy concerns [12]. If an attacker is able to steal the biometric
template of a victim, the victim’s biometrics are forever lost to the
attacker. The victim cannot reasonably revoke and reset their phys-
iological or behavioral traits, as they could a stolen password or
smart card. Furthermore, through analysis of a biometric template,
an attacker may be able to derive private, personal information
about the victim user, such as: ethnicity, age, gender, and health
condition [7, 8].
In paper [20], the authors propose the BioCapsule (BC) scheme
to address these security and privacy concerns. This fusion-based
cancellable biometric scheme involves the introduction of a refer-
ence subject (RS). Each user chooses (or is assigned) a RS. Then,
during registration or authentication, a user’s sampled biometrics
are securely fused with the biometrics of their corresponding RS.
This secure fusion yields a BC which can be used for biometric
recognition. Through the BC scheme’s secure fusion process, the
contributions of the user and RS features toward the resulting BC
are masked. Therefore, analysis of the resulting BC does not reveal
the user or RS biometric features, even in the case most favorable
to an adversary.
In this paper, we enhance the BioCapsule method by incorporat-
ing deep learning techniques for preprocessing and feature extrac-
tion tasks. This allows us to demonstrate the BC scheme’s ability
to be embedded within any deep learning based recognition which
uses the most current and robust techniques. We extend the BC
scheme from the domain of iris recognition (the initial biometric
trait used for testing the BC scheme) to facial recognition. This
allows us to demonstrate the BC scheme’s general applicability to
any biometric recognition system irrespective of which biometric
trait it uses. We will robustly evaluate the BC scheme’s security
and privacy benefits as well as its effect on the performance of an
underlying biometric recognition system. We conducted extensive
experiments on BC-embedded facial recognition systems and com-
pared the performance of the BC scheme against other cancellable
biometric techniques as well. The experimental results demonstrate
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that the BC scheme has minimal or no effect on the performance
of the underlying systems which it is embedded into and that the
BC scheme performs as well, or outperforms many other secure
biometrics techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer a brief
summary of related work. In Section 3 we overview the BC scheme
by highlighting BC’s primary components and its seamless inte-
gration with any biometric recognition techniques, processes and
systems. In Section 4 we propose an underlying biometrics system
for the domain of facial authentication which leverages state-of-
the-art biometric recognition, deep learning, and machine learning
techniques. In Section 5 we provide the specific details of how the
BC scheme can be embedded into the proposed underlying sys-
tem. In Section 6 we perform a comprehensive experiment which
compares the performance of the BC-embedded system against
the performance of the underlying system. We also compare the
proposed BC-embedded system to many previously proposed, pop-
ular secure biometrics techniques. In Section 7 we offer concluding
remarks and we outline future work directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
In recent years, manymethods have been proposed and investigated
in hopes of securing biometric templates. Two broad classes of ap-
proaches for securing biometric templates have emerged: biometric
cryptosystems (BCS) and cancellable biometrics (CB).
BCS approaches generate authentication keys from sampled bio-
metrics, rather than using sampled biometrics directly for authen-
tication. BCS approaches yield biometric dependant public data,
known as helper data, which can be used to derive corresponding
authentication keys. This helper data must not reveal too much
about user biometrics and must be stored by the system during
registration. Based on how this helper data is used, BCS can be split
into two subclasses of approaches: key binding and key generation
schemes. In key binding schemes, a user must provide secret in-
formation, such as a PIN, which is combined with their biometric
template in order to generate helper data [1, 24]. In key generation
schemes, helper data is derived directly from the original biometric
template [5, 9]. In both key binding and key generating schemes,
keys are derived from the resulting helper data.
CB approaches involve applying transformations to a biometric
template and using the altered (cancellable) template for authen-
tication. If a cancellable template is stolen, the attacker cannot
derive the personal information of the user. In addition, the user
can revoke, or cancel, the cancellable biometric template and alter
their biometrics differently for future authentication tasks. CB ap-
proaches can be divided into two subclasses: salting schemes and
noninvertible transformations. In salting schemes, users provide
secret information such as a password or PIN. Their biometric tem-
plate is then transformed by an invertible function with respect to
the provided secret information [17, 22]. Since these transforma-
tions are typically invertible to some extent, the secure storage of
each user’s corresponding secret information becomes of the utmost
importance. In noninvertible transformations schemes, a biometric
template is transformed using a noninvertible (or one-way) function
[4, 14]. Unfortunately, many noninvertible transformations systems
are not provably secure, and are indeed invertible under certain
conditions [13]. For both salting and noninvertible transformations
schemes, the transformations applied to biometric templates must
be chosen with care. On one hand, the transformations must con-
ceal user biometrics if transformed templates are compromised.
Furthermore, the transformations must preserve user privacy. On
the other hand, if these transformations raise interclass similar-
ity or raise intraclass variability, the performance of the biometric
recognition system will suffer [12].
3 OVERVIEW OF THE BC SCHEME
The BC scheme is elegant, yet simple in design. Its secure fusion
process involves three main steps (see Figure 1). First, representa-
tive signatures are extracted from both user and RS features. Next,
the extracted signatures are mapped to multiple values of 1 and
-1 in order to generate keys. Finally, fusion takes place. The key
derived from user features is used to alter RS features through
element-wise multiplication. Similarly, the RS key is used to alter
user features. The altered user and RS features are finally fused
using an unweighted vector addition. This fusion process can be
represented in the following formula:
FU ser,RS = FU ser ∗ KRS + FRS ∗ KU ser
where FU ser and FRS are the user and RS features respectively,
KU ser and KRS are the user and RS keys respectively, ∗ is element-
wise multiplication, + is vector addition, and FU ser,RS is the re-
sulting BC.
In a BC-embedded biometric recognition system, the BC scheme
is used to alter all biometrics sampled by the system. Each time
the user’s biometrics are sampled by the system, they are fused
with the biometrics of the user’s corresponding RS. As a result, BCs,
rather than the original user templates, are used for authentication.
Therefore, if an attacker infiltrates the system, BCs are compromised
rather than users’ true biometric templates. The attackers will not
be able to derive information about the user from stolen BCs, as
they are privacy-preserving. Furthermore, if any security concern
arises, users can revoke compromised BCs and can use a different
RS for BC generation in the future. In addition, [20] have indicated
that the BC approach has only very minor affects on underlying
iris recognition system accuracy.
The elegant, simple design of the BC scheme yields highly ad-
vantageous properties. Rather than dictating which preprocessing,
alignment, segmentation, feature extraction, or classification steps
occur within a biometric recognition system in order to accommo-
date it, the BC scheme’s flexible design allows it to instead embed
itself within existing systems. As shown in Figure 1, only the BC
scheme’s secure fusion process, involving signature extraction, key
generation and feature fusion steps (which themselves could be
flexible), must be embedded into the existing system. This gives
system designers the flexibility to design an underlying biometric
system how they wish, with no direct consideration for the BC
scheme. After designing an underling system, the system designer
can then embed the BC scheme within their system in order to
secure it and the privacy of its users. Due to this elegant design, the
BC scheme is uniquely fit to secure biometric recognition systems
which utilize these techniques.
Though the BC scheme introduces no constraints upon a sys-
tem’s recognition pipeline, the BC scheme does require the introduc-
tion of RSs. Furthermore, anytime a user wishes to be authenticated,
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Figure 1: BioCapsule secure fusion process and its ability to be embedded into existing systems
a RS must be provided to (or selected by) the system. This is because,
without a RS, BC fusion is not possible.
The incorporation of RSs in a BC-embedded system is quite
flexible. A user can choose or be assigned a corresponding RS. The
user can decide to keep their RS public or private (with no loss in
template privacy benefits). All users can choose (or be assigned) a
unique RS, or sets of users can choose (or be assigned) the same
RS. Since user and RS biometrics contribute equally in BC fusion,
multiple users having the same RS introduces no security concerns
(though it may reduce system performance as seen in Section 6).
When being authenticated, the user could provide their RS to the
system in many different ways. A few examples are:
• In high security scenarios, the RS could be a physical object the
user could provide at authentication time. In this type of system,
only a database of registered BCs would need to be maintained by
the system. Storing RSs and information about which user(s) each
RS corresponds to would not be unnecessary.
• A set of RSs could also be provided by the system for the user
to choose from at authentication time. In this type of system, a
database of registered BCs and RSs would need to be maintained
by the system.
• The system could store and automatically use the user’s corre-
sponding RS at authentication time. This method would provide the
most convenience to the user as they would not need to keep track
of their RS. The user would still be protected by the BC scheme’s
robust security and privacy benefits. In this type of system, a data-
base of registered BCs, RSs and information about which user(s)
each RS corresponds to would need to be maintained.
In addition to being flexible in design, the BC scheme also offers
robust, provably secure and privacy-preserving benefits. Since the
signature extraction, key generation and fusion steps of the BC
scheme each have one-way properties, the resulting BC scheme
can be shown to be essentially a one-way function. In paper [20],
authors formally proved many security and privacy benefits of the
BC scheme. These benefits include that the BC scheme is robust in
defending against the following four types of attacks. (1) The first
type of attack is the case in which a BC is stolen and the attacker
then attempts to derive the user’s biometric feature vector, which is
impossible since it will be equivalent to solving an underdetermined
equation. (2) The next type of attack is the case in which the attacker
has stolen a user’s BC and the user’s corresponding RS. This will
result in the attacker deriving two possibilities for each value of
the user’s feature vector (as they will need to guess 1 or -1 for
each value within the user’s key). This means that the number of
possible user feature vectors will grow exponentially with respect
to size of the user feature vector. In our proposed system,O(2512) ≈
O(10154) possible feature vectors can be derived, making obtaining
the user’s true feature vector computationally infeasible. (3) The
third type of attack is the case in which the attacker attempts to
derive the RS from multiple stolen BCs of one or multiple users,
which is to solve an underdetermined system of equations and thus
is impossible. (4) The final type of attack is the case the attacker
has stolen multiple BCs (where the BCs belong to several or one
user) and their corresponding RSs, which results in many sub-cases
of (2), which are computationally infeasible. The detailed proofs
can be found in [20].
4 UNDERLYING SYSTEM DESIGN INVOLVING
DEEP-LEARNING MECHANISMS
In this section we propose a biometric recognition system for facial
authentication. This underlying system will be used to embed the
BC schemewithin. Since the BC scheme is flexible in design, we only
aimed at using the most state-of-the-art deep learning techniques
in these systems, and did not directly consider how the chosen
techniques would work in conjunction with the BC scheme.
The first step of the biometric recognition systems is to per-
form alignment and segmentation. We chose to utilize the popular
Multi-Task (Cascaded) Convolutional Neural Network (MTCNN)
method [25] within our biometric recognition systems. This method
was quite robust and outperformed other alignment\segmentation
methods which we tried. This method uses a cascade (ensemble)
of three convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to perform facial
and facial landmark detection. The output of the cascade is a set
of facial detection windows, each with five corresponding facial
landmark points (left\right eyes, nose, left\right sides of mouth).
We were able to find and utilize an open source implementation of
MTCNN given by [16].
After we retrieved the (center-most) facial detection bounding
box and five corresponding facial landmark points for a given input
image, we performed alignment and segmentation. To perform
alignment, we rotated the face such that angle between the two
eye points would be zero. We then performed segmentation by
forwarding the aligned image through the MTCNN a second time.
This gave us a facial bounding box for the rotated, aligned image.
We used this bounding box to segment the face from the image.
We chose to include a 42 pixel margin around the bounding box in
order to capture more facial details such as chin shape, hair line,
color and style, ears, etc.
The second step of the biometric authentication system is feature
extraction. For facial feature extraction we use the popular FaceNet
method [18]. The FaceNetmethod involves extracting facial features
using a CNN and embedding the resulting extracted facial features
into a compact Euclidean space (with 512 dimensions in our case).
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Within this Euclidean space, Euclidean distance between facial
feature embeddings directly denotes facial dissimilarity.
We were able to find and utilize an open source FaceNet model
given by [16]. This open source FaceNet model extracts facial fea-
tures using a CNN with an Inception-ResNet-v1 architecture [21].
After we have extracted features from an image, we are ready
to perform classification. To perform classification, each registered
subject in the biometric authentication system is given a linear
binary Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. Each subject’s
SVM is trained with all registered features of the subject as positive
samples. Every other subject’s registered features are then used as
negative samples. Given a test feature and a subject the test feature
claims to be, the authentication system classifies the test feature
using the chosen subject’s binary SVM. This results in a classifica-
tion decision indicating that the test feature is the subject whom
they claim to be or is not this subject. If the classifier indicates the
test feature is the more likely subject, the feature is authenticated
by the system and rejected otherwise.
5 BIOCAPSULE GENERATION
BC generation involves the secure fusion process. This process
utilizes the output of the previously discussed alignment, segmen-
tation and feature extraction steps. It should be noted that the
resulting BC-embedded system pipeline only differs from the un-
derlying system with the inclusion of the RS and the BC secure
fusion process.
Using a 2-core Intel Core i7-6500u CPU, generating each Bio-
Capsule takes ~0.012 seconds. It should be noted that the BC gen-
eration time is substantially faster than alignment\segmentation
and feature extraction steps which take ~0.2 and ~0.185 seconds
respectively using the same Intel Core i7-6500u CPU. Therefore,
the BC scheme does not have significant effects upon the scalability
of an underlying biometric recognition system.
The first step in the secure fusion process is signature extraction.
For signature extraction, we use the three-level averaging method
described by [6], although a different signature extraction method
could be used if the system designer wishes. The chosen method
involves first reshaping the input 512x1 feature vector into a 32x16
matrix. Then, two averaging convolutions of different sizes are
applied to the feature matrix. The resulting matrices are subtracted
and a row-wise average is taken of the 32x16 difference. Finally, the
resulting 32x1 vector values are multiplied by 102 and rounded to
integer values to obtain the input feature matrix’s signature.
The second step of the secure fusion process is key generation.
The key generation process utilizes a feature’s extracted signature.
Each of a signature’s 32 values are used as seeds in a pseudo random
number generator to generate 16 uniformly random values (for
a total of 512 random values) between 0 and 1. These randomly
generated values are placed into a key vector of shape 512x1 (the
same size as the initial FaceNet feature vector) and rounded to
integer values of 0 or 1. All values within the key that were rounded
to 0 are then changed to -1.
Since the key values are derived directly from a signature (which
in turn is derived directly from a user feature vector), key stability
and distinguishability are directly related to signature stability and
distinguishability. Therefore, it can be expected that keys which
were derived from similar signatures will, as a result, be more
similar than keys derived from less similar signatures. This is not
certain though, as all key values are mapped to 1 or -1 using pseudo
random number generation and rounding. It is possible for two
different signatures to be mapped to the same key 16 values, but the
probability of this occurring is 1216 =
1
65536 ≈ 0.0015%. Therefore, it
is indeed possible, though very unlikely, for dissimliar signatures
to produce similar keys.
The final step of the secure fusion process is the fusion step. From
this fusion step we obtain a resulting BioCapsule. A pair of keys are
obtained from both a user’s feature vector and the feature vector of
the user’s RS. The user key is used to alter the RS feature through
element-wise multiplication. Likewise, the RS key is used to alter
the user feature through element-wise multiplication. Through this
alteration, the contribution of the features to the final resulting
BC is masked. Finally the altered biometrics are fused through an
unweighted addition operation to obtain a BC.
After a BC is generated, it can be used for authentication. BCs are
classified using the same aforementioned method which the under-
lying system uses in order to classify regular, unsecured biometric
templates.
6 EXPERIMENT
For our experiment, we compare the performance of the proposed
underlying authentication system with the performance of the BC-
embedded system. This comparison will reveal how embedding
the BC scheme into an existing biometric recognition system will
affect the underlying system’s performance. We also compare the
BC scheme to many popular CB and BCS approaches.
For each BC-embedded system test, we consider two cases. The
first test case, which we will refer to as the Same RS case, is an
adversarial test case which is the most unfavorable possible case
for the BC scheme. In this test case all registered users within the
training data and all test users in the testing data use the same RS
for BC generation. As a result, any BC fusion that takes place will
use the same RS feature vector and key. This will, in effect, make all
resulting BCs more similar due to the similarity of the RS feature
and key used to generate them.
The second test case, which we will refer to as the Unique RS
case, is the most favorable possible case for the BC scheme. In this
test case, all subjects are assigned a unique RS. In this case, it is
likely the BC-embedded scheme will outperform the underlying
system. This is because each subject will have a single, unique RS
to use to generate it’s resulting BCs. Therefore, different subjects
will have different RSs which, as a result, will make their resulting
BCs dissimilar. This, as a result, will raise interclass variability and
lower interclass similarity.
For each test, we report several metrics commonly used to eval-
uate biometric recognition systems [13], such as: accuracy (ACC),
false acceptance rate (FAR), false rejection rate (FRR) and equal
error rate (EER). For all tests, RSs were taken from the 10k US Adult
Faces dataset [3].
6.1 Authentication Experiment
For our authentication experiment, we utilize the Caltech Faces 1999
dataset [23] and the Georgia Tech Face Database dataset [2]. The
Caltech Faces 1999 dataset contains 450 images of 31 subjects. The
database features variation in image setting, illumination and facial
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Table 1: Authentication Experiment Results
Method Dataset ACC FAR FRR EER
Underlying System [23] 99.98% 0% 0.45% 0%
BC (Same RS) [23] 99.98% 0% 0.45% 0%
BC (Unique RS) [23] 99.98% 0% 0.45% 0%
Underlying System [2] 99.99% 0% 0.267% 0%
BC (Same RS) [2] 99.98% 0% 0.8% 0%
BC (Unique RS) [2] 100% 0% 0% 0%
expression. We chose to remove five subjects from our experiment.
This was because each of these subjects only had one corresponding
image. Furthermore, three of the subjects were not actual humans,
but were drawings. This resulted in a dataset of 445 images of
26 subjects. The Georgia Tech Face Database dataset contains 750
images of 15 subjects. The dataset features variation in illumination,
facial expression, facial pose and clothing.
We performed an authentication experiment using the previously
proposed systems. We used a 5-fold cross validation test on each
dataset. Each subject’s binary SVM made acceptance and rejection
classifications simply based on which was more likely. Therefore,
if the probability of a test feature\BC belonging to the positive
class was more likely (above 50%), the test feature\BC was accepted.
Otherwise it was rejected. The results of this experiment can be
seen in Table 1.
For the Caltech Faces 1999 dataset, the underlying system, the
Same RS BC-embedded system and the Unique RS BC-embedded
system perform identically. For the Georgia Tech Face Database
dataset, the three systems perform slightly differently. The under-
lying system achieves a FAR of 0% with a FRR of 0.267%. The Same
RS BC-embedded system performs slightly worse with a FAR of
0% and a FRR of 0.8%. As expected, the Unique RS BC-embedded
system performs the best with perfect results of a FAR of 0% and a
FRR of 0%.
For all authentication tests, an EER of 0% is achieved. This means
that all the systems in each of the tests were capable of performing
perfectly. Had we performed a validation step after training each
subject’s binary SVM and before performing testing, we could have
better chosen the SVM authentication threshold. From a validation
step, we may have seen that the binary SVM thresholds could have
actually been set below 50%. With these lower thresholds, we could
have prevented some of the false rejections while, at the same time,
preventing any false acceptances.
Though not perfect, these results are quite encouraging. They
give clear indication that the BC scheme can be embedded into
a state-of-the-art facial authentication system and provide robust
security and privacy benefits while, at the same time, only slightly
affecting the underlying system performance.
6.2 Comparison with Existing Methods
We also compared the BC scheme with many popular CB and BCS
methods. We tested the proposed BC-embedded system in the Same
RS and Unique RS cases using the same dataset and testing method
of several popular secure biometric methods. This allows us to
compare the BC scheme’s performance against other proposed
secure biometric schemes. The results of each of these comparisons
can be seen in Table 2. We report our results in terms of the metric(s)
used in the original paper of the technique which we compare the
BC scheme with.
The first CB method we compared the BC scheme to was the
MACE cancellable filtering based method [17]. In this method, se-
cret PINs are used to generate minimum average correlation energy
(MACE) filters. These filters are then applied to facial images in
order to create cancellable, secure templates. The MACE authors
report a verification EER of 0% which we were also able to achieve
using both the Same RS and Unique RS BC-embedded systems.
The second CB method we compared the BC scheme with was
the Cancellable 2DPCA method proposed by [4]. The authors use
polynomial functions and co-occurrencematrices in order tomodify
facial images. They then use principal component analysis (PCA)
for dimensionality reduction and classification. They report an
authentication accuracy of 96%. The Same RS and Unique RS BC-
embedded systems were able to achieve accuracies of 99.92% and
99.98% respectively.
The next method we compared the BC scheme to was the BCS
Fuzzy Vault based method for faces [24]. This method fuses the
biometric template of a user with a key the user must also provide.
The authors perform an authentication experiment and report a best
FAR of 5.26% and a best FRR of 26%. The Same RS BC-embedded
system was able to achieve a FAR of 0% with a FRR of 3%. The
Unique RS BC-embedded system was able to achieve a FAR of 0%
with a FRR of 0.5%.
Next, we compared the BC scheme to the CB Mixing Biometrics
(MB) method [14]. In many respects, this method is more similar
to the BC scheme than any other method we compared the BC
method with. The MB method uses the facial landmarks of a user
facial image and the facial landmarks of a RS-like image in order
to fuse the two faces. Classification is then performed using the
fused face. Though this method is similar to the BC method in
some respects, the BC method has some clear advantages. The
MB method requires certain predefined alignment steps to take
place for facial fusing. The BC requires no fixed alignment steps.
The BC approach also preserves user privacy. From a stolen BC,
an attacker cannot derive personal information about the victim,
even when the RS image is also stolen. Unfortunately, from MB
fused faces, it would not be difficult for attackers to derive personal
information of the user. The personal information (such as gender,
ethnicity, age, etc.) of the user are clearly visible in the MB fused
face. Furthermore, if the attacker obtained the fused face and the
Table 2: Comparison of BC with other Methods
Method Dataset Metric Result
MACE [17] [19] (Subset) EER 0%
BC (Same RS) [19] (Subset) EER 0%
BC (Unique RS) [19] (Subset) EER 0%
Can. 2DPCA [4] [15] ACC 96%
BC (Same RS) [15] ACC 99.92%
BC (Unique RS) [15] ACC 99.98%
Fuzzy Vault [24] [15] FAR,FRR 5.26%,23%
BC (Same RS) [15] FAR,FRR 0%,3%
BC (Unique RS) [15] FAR,FRR 0%,0.5%
MB [14] [10] EER 6%
BC (Same RS) [10] EER 0%
BC (Unique RS) [10] EER 0%
SCiFI [11] [19] (Subset) TPR 80%
BC (Same RS) [19] (Subset) TPR 99.26%
BC (Unique RS) [19] (Subset) TPR 99.85%
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RS-like image used for facial fusion in the MB method, the attacker
would certainly be able to derive the personal information of the
victim user by reversing the fusing process. The MB authors use
the IMM face dataset [10] for an identification experiment, as the
IMM face dataset has preannotated facial landmarks. The authors
report an identification EER of 6%. Both the Same RS and Unique
RS BC-embedded systems are able to achieve an EER of 0%.
The final method we compared the BC scheme to was the CB
Secure Computation of Face Identification method (SCiFI) [11]. This
method uses a secure Principal Component Analysis (PCA) compu-
tation in order to identify faces. The authors report a identification
(rank one) true positive rate of 80%. The Same RS and Unique RS
BC-embedded systems are able to achieve true positive rates of
99.26% and 99.85% respectively.
Each of these comparisons demonstrates that the BC is able to
outperform or perform as well as other proposed secure biometric
methods. In addition to the BC’s superior performance, the BC
provides many advantages that not necessarily all of the compared
methods do. The BC scheme is flexible in design, provably secure
and privacy-preserving unlike most of the compared methods.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have shown that the BC method can be used effectively for
facial authentication. The BC scheme can be embedded seamlessly
into an existing biometric authentication system with virtually no
constraint on how the underlying system operates. This flexible
design of the BC scheme allowed us to embed the BC scheme in a
recognition system which used state-of-the-art biometric recogni-
tion, deep learning techniques. The BC scheme offers an underlying
system robust security and privacy benefits while, at the same time,
only affecting the underlying system’s performance slightly. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that the BC system performs as well as
or outperforms many popular secure biometric techniques.
As future work, we believe the BC scheme could be used effec-
tively to facilitate a hierarchical role-based access control (RBAC)
scheme. In such a scheme, during authentication a user could spec-
ify their RS. In addition to this RS being used for BC generation and
protection of the user’s biometric information, the RS could also
denote the user’s role. Based on this role, the user could be granted
corresponding privileges as defined by the RBAC scheme. Another
future work direction is investigating the intraclass and interclass
similarity of BCs formed by the fusion of a user’s biometrics with
biometrics of multiple RSs. In the proposed BC scheme, if the BC
database is compromised, users are able to securely revoke their
compromised BCs and register new ones. If users could instead
fuse their compromised BCs with new, secondary RSs, the new BCs
could then be used for future recognition tasks. In the future, users
would simply need to form BCs using their biometrics and their
first RS and then fuse the resulting BC with the new, secondary RS.
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